CHRISTOPH JAMME

Truth and Fake News

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We are supposedly living in an age of information, but this information is increasingly becoming a problem - not the information itself actually, but rather the ways to obtain it. Young people, for example, do not get their information from traditional media, but from YouTube and other social media. When you start dealing with a topic, YouTube can work like blinders on your face. What YouTube offers the user is always based on what he or she has previously searched for or newly searches for. The recommendation algorithms of YouTube therefore fade out other perhaps disturbing views in the long run and strengthen the user in his or her own (perhaps radicalising) opinion. This also makes these social media platforms highly vulnerable to demagogy, as the current campaign against the EU copyright reform has shown. Emotional mobilisation often takes the place of the factual content of speeches. With a wave of false claims populists flood the public space. More and more people are convinced, for example, that climate change is not our responsibility. They consider statements of climate researchers as a symptom of a global conspiracy. But the alternative cannot be to place the sceptics in the corner of mindless contemporaries without further ado. Philosophy must offer a reaction to this spreading scepticism. This consists of explaining in detail which arguments and trains of thought lead climate scientists to their results. For some years now, there has been a growing community of philosophers of science worldwide (for example Eric Winsberg), who are intensively engaged in climate research and who critically examine their approach, the assumptions they make, the prevailing uncertainties and the validity of their statements.

It is important that philosophers venture out of the academic cover and express themselves on politically and economically relevant topics. Many, not only representatives of liberal points of view, see a threat in the deliberate misinformation of right-wing populists. Democracy, it seems, requires policy that is oriented towards facts. For example, the State Chancellery of Rhineland-Palatinate recently issued the following statement: "We are convinced that the unconditional recognition of facts is part of the foundation of values of our liberal public. The willingness, indeed the necessity, to separate certainties from assumptions and facts from opinions is essential for the success of a democratic debate". (The authors of this "declaration" were Prime Minister Malu Dreyer and the writer Robert Menasse. The fact that Menasse of all people swears by factual fidelity is, however, somewhat strange, since he himself invented facts). As correct as it is that knowledge, not feelings, should guide action, otherwise the integrity of the community is threatened, it is also correct that a policy saturated with facts is not per se connected with democracy, and conversely a democratic constitution is not necessarily connected with a dominance of facts. Yes, as the classical scholar Jonas Grethlein recently wrote, "the appeal to facts has more of an elitist trait; it presupposes an education that one claims for oneself and denies one’s opponents. As justified as the indignation at deliberate disinformation is, insisting on objectivity and denouncing sophistical rhetoric can itself be a rhetorical strategy and a means of pursuing tangible particular interests". (FAZ 12/18/2018).

What makes it even more difficult is that reality does not have that ontologically fixed meaning as it is put in position by Frank Böckelmann to Norbert Bolz against unpleasant political opponents of the left-liberal spectrum. "Reality", according to Christian Geyer, cannot be "plucked from the tree like a ripe apple". Those who monopolise the real as the "Realissimum" (Böckelmann) ignore the fact that it is not possible to get beyond concepts of the real, either for fundamental epistemological considerations or for practical political experience. "One of the great achievements of cultural studies," Helmuth Lethen states, "has been and still is to examine which linguistic and visual construction elements produce the ’effects of the real’, how realities are produced by routine or unexpected techniques of an - whether it shines from within (evidentia) or is classified as merely apparent - manifestation. The same applies to the reference to alleged truths. Here, too, a fundamental philosophical reflection is needed. 

I.

The concept of truth is one of the most controversial concepts in philosophy. For example, Kant argued that there is no general criterion of truth (KrV B 82).  But it is indispensable, because science is based on knowledge and this is based on the possession of truth. The question of truth - first and foremost: what truth is, i.e. the question of the concept (meaning, significance, essence, etc.) of truth - is thus a central question of philosophy. G. Siegwart writes that the topic of truth is one of those privileged parts of the philosophical problematic that has not lost interest through any of the numerous changes in the way of thinking or has even been effectively pushed into obsolescence. According to Siegwart, this survivability may be interpreted as a reliable indicator of the over-complexity of the problem in the community of philosophers.

In the following, I will first deal with theoretical truth, i.e. with an epistemological or epistemic concept of truth, before going on to discuss the moral dimension. I will first try to give you a very brief overview of central determinations of truth that have been discussed since antiquity. (See the article ’Truth’ by Petra Kolmer, in: Neues Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe. Volume 3, Freiburg i. Brsg. 2011, 2397-2415). First, there is the ontological determination of truth, as Plato formulated it in his dialogue "The State". According to "The state", it is the "idea of the good" that gives truth to the existing, thus, both the being in reality as well as the being recognisable as truth; according to this, it still ranks above truth. This ontological definition of truth has become famous in Augustine’s formulation: "verum mihi videtur esse id quod est (True seems to me what is). Besides, the so-called correspondence theory or adequation theory of truth, which was also founded in antiquity, namely originally by Aristotle, has become famous. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas gave it the valid formulation: "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus" (truth is the agreement of the thing and reason). From this the classical verificationism developed, which is today represented by Russell, Wittgenstein and Austin: a statement is true exactly when it agrees with an actually existing situation, i.e. a fact. The crucial problem for this theory is to give a clear meaning to the expressions "fact" and "agreement" that appear in the definition. Heidegger has therefore criticised the traditional concept of truth as mere "certainty" and asked what is always already implicitly included in the relational whole of the adaequatio of Intellectus and Res or what character this inclusion has. The decline to the subject-object relation as well as the associated outcome of recognition (which is carried out in judgement) do not go far enough. Thus, the task is to question the nature of being of cognition itself. This lies in the "being discovering" of the statement, which, however, is only possible ontologically on the basis of being in the world. The discovery of the statement and the discovery of inner-worldly being, however, is, on its part, based on the openness or closedness of existence. This means that the truth has to be wrested from the existing again and again. Heidegger already finds this in the Greek equivalent for truth, A-letheia, which means opening-up, unclosure. L. B. Puntel’s coherence theory (oriented on G.W.F. Hegel) also draws attention to the ontological aspects of a theory of truth, which brings truth as a system of systems (language and world) - in a new way - to bear and, with respect to the theory of equation in particular, pursues an integrative approach. The starting point is the realisation, already formulated by late medieval authors, that even if a propositional concept of truth is chosen as the starting point, a pure sentence analysis (e.g. in the context of formal semantics) is not sufficient. For it must also be examined how sentences are connected with reality at all and how they can be made true through it. And for such an examination it is crucial that it is explained what is meant here by reality at all. Behind this is the concept-realistic assumption, again going back to the Middle Ages, of a world "per se" structured by proposition, which was advocated above all by Hegel and the late Wittgenstein. Here, the world is theoretically essentially a totality of facts, an "intelligible realm" that can be expressed through sentence-like language and is also designed to be expressible. According to Puntel, propositions can thus not only be understood as the informational content of a sentence, but also as a primary ontological identity, if the ground is to be removed from the opposition of language and reality characteristic of object ontology and truth - with a claim to truth, by the way - is to be able to be brought to bear philosophically in the sense in which we intuitively understand it: as a realistic correspondence relation in the sense of the theory of adequation of truth. We find a similar theory of coherence in the works of Otto Neurath and Nicolas Rescher: the truth of a statement consists in the fact that it can be coherently integrated into a system of statements. The consensus theory of truth (Peirce, Habermas) also plays an important role in the present: a statement is true if under ideal conditions a consensus about it would result.

It is interesting to look at legal practice in relation to the current philosophical theories of truth. While the theory and practice of law adhere in principle to the correspondence theory by formulating the judicial claim to reconstruct what has actually taken place, approaches to consensus theory are found where criminal and civil law allow for agreements and compromises between the parties to the proceedings. Nowhere, however, is a "objectified claim to truth" completely abandoned.

Despite all the differences, there is broad agreement in philosophy today that the term "true" should only be applied to statements and to the logical function of sentences, especially sentences in the declarative-theoretical context of asserting, characterising, referring to, i.e. complex expressions of "cognitive" (sentence-shaped and including an ontological system of concepts) language. There is also broad agreement that the concept of truth must be distinguished from the concept of justification or vindication. A statement can be true without being justified, and likewise it can be justified but false. Furthermore, truth - in contrast to the concept of reasonableness - is absolute, i.e. not gradable. While a salary can be more or less well justified, it would be pointless to say that one statement is truer than another or true to a certain degree.

Today there are many theorists who argue that "truth" has no cognitive content and must ultimately be abandoned (postmodern or relativistic thinkers). Gottlob Frege and Donald Davidson have put forward the thesis "that the content of the word ’true’ is quite unique and indefinable" (Frege 1918). But I am firmly convinced that the diversity and ambiguity, at least sketched out, which have always characterised philosophical concepts of truth and theories of truth as well as our non-philosophical understanding of truth, can philosophically neither be reduced nor eliminated. For what we understand by "true" and "truth" depends on guiding convictions and fundamental intentions that belong to an ultimately personally existential view of reality as a whole. This view includes a supreme practical purpose. Already in antiquity, truth, or the term ’true’, denotes not only the goal of knowledge but also the ethical imperative of truthfulness.  Thus, it is not only error but also lies. Our understandings of truth, concepts and theories are dependent on concept-less insights concerning ourselves, our life experience and our difficult existence in the world.

Before I will come to this practical-moral concept of truth, I would like to draw your attention to a text that has been quite popular in philosophy and literary studies in recent years, namely Nietzsche’s posthumous essay "Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außerermoralischen Sinne" ("On Truth and Lies in the Extra-moral Sense") from 1873. Because of the character of language as a mere metaphor of things, Nietzsche criticises the claim to truth raised by philosophy in language. A term is only "the residue of a metaphor" and truth is thus only "a mobile army of metaphors", i.e. an illusion of which we have only forgotten that it is an illusion. In striking proximity to the language theory of early Romanticism, Nietzsche thus allows the philosophical formation of concepts to be preceded by an artistic formation of metaphor and declares science to be the "burial place of contemplation". However, at the peak of the scientific formation of concepts, the original artistic need broke through again: "That urge to form methaphors... is in reality not conquered and hardly tamed by the fact that a fortress is built for him from his volatilised products, the concepts... He looks for a new area of his work and a different river bed and finds it in myth and in art in general". In this way, Nietzsche reverses the fundamental relationship between art and science: because he derives science from a metaphorical drive, science is only of a transitory character and turns into art. Here, a lot could be said about the relationship between myth and truth, but I have already done this in detail elsewhere and therefore will not repeat it here.

II.

Let us therefore return to truth in the moral sense. Already in antiquity there was the firm conviction that one must think about the difference between true and false for the sole reason that one cannot act politically responsibly otherwise. Since Plato’s Dialogue Theaitet and the Stoa’s confrontation with academic scepticism, the difference between opinion (doxa) and knowledge, or rather the question of how to arrive at a well-founded opinion, has always been at stake. It is about the reasons. It is important to show that there is not only the possibility of true opinions, but that one can also know something and not just mean it. In Plato’s Dialogue Sophistes, therefore, the question is asked, using the difference between philosophers and sophists as an example, whether someone could really know everything. The sophist lacks the character of the philosophically modest thinker. If the sophist claims to be able to talk about everything antilogically, he implicitly claims to be omniscient. Plato, however, proves that he is not an original creator or designer, but only a "mimetes", an imitator or actor, or in short, a "sham artist" (which then leads in further dialogue to the question of how appearance can be logically grasped). So it is all about the reasons. It does not matter whether one claims something from mere hearsay, whether one refers to the headlines of a tabloid or to actual characteristics of a factual situation that have been confirmed in several studies. The reasoning should not be delegated. Everyone who expresses an opinion and assigns a claim to validity to it must do so himself. One cannot, as Trump did, for example, in his accusations of espionage against the Obama administration, refer to arbitrary sources and suspend, or even refuse to suspend, one’s own quality control of these sources. But also in the new journalism, as Harald Martenstein recently noted critically, the word ’truth’ has become a synonym for (political) "opinion", which he illustrates with the Relotius case.

The so-called knowledge society today, to quote Dieter Simon (the former president of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities), assumes a "desperate resemblance to a society of faith". The myths of truth and pure rationality, objectivity and even independence in science are being deconstructed with unbelievable brutality. The fact that this now almost daily attack on objectivity, that the now omnipresent fake news increasingly undermine our democracy, has already been warned by the great Hannah Ahrendt. In her essay "Truth and Politics" she distinguishes between factual truths and rational truths, which claim different criteria of validity. Facts are outside of agreement and voluntary consent, opinions about facts do not contribute anything to their content. Truths of reason are principles that underlie our norms and values and are based on reasons that are first and foremost established in socio-political discourse. Truths of fact and of reason belong in the political sphere, but behave like fire and water, because the truth of facts cannot be disputed pluralistically (truth is despotic, Hannah Ahrendt states). Currently, the media production treats facts as if they were opinions that can be argued about in public (a good example is climate change). The consequence is the inclusion of the difference and thus of the fact itself. The transformation in politics and society that can be observed today goes beyond the lie. It affects our knowledge system, which guides our thinking and actions (according to Christina Schües). Our relation to reality and our sense of orientation needs the truth of the facts, it needs the judgement "True" or "False". Ahrendt writes: "Where facts are consistently replaced by lies and fictions, it turns out that there is no substitute for truth. The truth is irreplaceable. If now the knowledge order that is to orientate society and individuals is based only on a diffuse plurality of opinions that cannot be linked back argumentatively either to reason or with experience, then the situation is precarious. Today we are not only experiencing the relativisation of unpleasant factual statements as mere expressions of opinion, as just mentioned in the example of climate change, but we are also experiencing an attack by politics on facts, such as the manipulation of historiography by politics. That is why we speak of a "postfactual age" today. "Postfactual" refers to a culture of discussion in which facts - that something is the case - play no or a lesser role as arguments. The idea that there is no such thing as objective truth leads to a general suspicion of the elites. There is a general suspicion against science, the "experts". The ideal of science is truth. It is the truth, the unattainable, that it strives for. But the ideal has currently faded, loses friends and followers (according to Dieter Simon). In the end, something very dangerous emerges: the total levelling of all knowledge and ignorance or the feeling of the total loss of criteria for distinction. If this loss spreads, a society can no longer function.

Society expects irrefutable truths from the sciences; evidence-based knowledge against lies and half-truths. But the role of science changes with society, according to Munich sociologist Armin Nassehi. It disappoints hopes for justifiable knowledge that is stable over time and applicable. Science no longer presents only facts. The disappointment is great when science cannot provide the clarity needed for political decision-making or entrepreneurial strategies. It is certainly no coincidence that philology is currently being rediscovered internationally in the age of fake news and Twitter diplomacy. The Indologist Sheldon Pollock even sees it as the foundation of liberal orders (see the small pamphlet "Philology and Freedom", 2017).

However, science, especially philosophy, provides society not only with answers but also with the right questions. It is an attempt to discover things differently than before. We must learn to engage with new questions and first ask what is the case before making political, moral or economic assessments. Such questions are more urgently needed today than ever. Truth, then, is not a problem invented by philosophers, nor is it an academic problem in the sense of theoretical sophistry, but rather it presents itself as a problem of life’s accomplishment for everyone in very different forms. Truth has to do with the seriousness of life, even theoretical truth still has to do with it. The question of truth thus originates from an original interest in reliability and is a fundamental question of human life. It is pre-theoretically (first): "What is true?" in the sense of "what can I rely on?". Truth, understood in this way, is ahead of the differentiation of theory and practice, of recognition and action, and permeates all references to life. Precisely for this reason - at this level and thus initially - one can just as correctly speak of a true friend and a true statement and a true event. Authenticity and, furthermore, reliability can thus be found as the immediate insight in which the speech of the true statement and all "speeches that are true about oneself" are agreed upon: What is true is substantiated (like statements) or reliable (e.g. in human interaction). Therefore, truth is a basic question of human life - and this even then, when we, philosophically and theoretically reflected (potentially with a claim to truth), ask what truth is. In this basic formulation, the question of truth arises in times of crisis, i.e. when what seemed to be reliable up to now proves to be unreliable in a radical sense, i.e. when the epochal view of reality that connects us across personal differences breaks down. It is precisely at a time like ours that a philosophical reflection on truth is not only appropriate, but highly topical and indispensable.

(September 2019)